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Abstract In this paper, we study using Destination Artificial Noise (DAN)
besides Source Artificial Noise (SAN) to enhance physical layer secrecy with
an outage probability based approach. It is assumed that all nodes in the
network (i.e. source, destination and eavesdropper) are equipped with multiple
antennas. In addition, the eavesdropper is passive and its channel state and
location are unknown at the source and destination. In our proposed scheme,
by optimized allocation of power to the SAN, DAN and data signal, a minimum
value for the outage probability is guaranteed at the eavesdropper, and at the
same time a certain level of signal to noise ratio (SNR) at the destination is
ensured. Our simulation results show that using DAN along with SAN brings
a significant enhancement in power consumption compared to methods that
merely adopt SAN to achieve the same outage probability at the eavesdropper.
Keywords Physical Layer Security, Artificial Noise, Destination Artificial
Noise (DAN), Source Artificial Noise (SAN), Full Duplex Communication,
Multiple-Input Multiple-Output (MIMO) systems.
1 Introduction
Due to weakness of traditional security methods which are based on using
cryptography algorithms in upper layers, physical layer security attracts many
attentions in the recent years. Physical Layer Security was first addressed by
Wyner’s celebrated paper [11] in which a wiretap channel was studied and
the notion of secrecy capacity was introduced. Since then, several studies have
extended the Wyner’s work, such as [6] for Gaussian wiretap channels, [12] for
fading channels and [7] for Multiple-Input Multiple-Output (MIMO) channels.
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One practical method in this area is using beamforming techniques in com-
bination with emission of an Artificial Noise (AN) at the data source side
(Alice) to corrupt an eavesdropper’s reception during transmission of data
to the destination (Bob) [4]. During past years several works have developed
this idea that most of them aim to maximize secrecy capacity. In a different
way, the authors in [8] proposed a probability based approach for employing
AN to guarantee a minimum level of outage probability at an unknown Eve
while satisfying a certain Quality of service (QoS) requirement at the Bob. It
should be noted that all these works are based on exploiting Source Artificial
Noise (SAN) that means sending a noise-like signal at the data-source side of
a wireless link.
Recently, thanks to the development of full-duplex communications, one
node can transmit and receive data signals at the same time and the same
frequency band [9], [13]. By full-duplex communications, it is possible to adopt
Destination Artificial Noise (DAN) at the destination along with the SAN at
the source. This idea was first proposed in [10] and then in [2] for Single-
Input Multiple-Output (SIMO) communication systems. In [15] the MIMO
communication systems when only one of the receiver antennas is used for
data reception has been studied, but in [14] destination can allocate more
antennas for receiving the data. Similar to SAN, most works on the DAN are
also based on maximizing secrecy capacity.
In this paper unlike to the previous works, we adopt an outage probability
based approach for the characterization of the physical layer security that
uses both DAN and SAN. In addition, we propose an optimal power allocation
method to the DAN, SAN and source information signal to ensure the security
requirements. We also investigate the effect of considering a power constraint
at the destination for the situation in which Bob can only cancel a certain
amount of self-interference. It is shown how this power constraint increases
the total required power for a certain level of security.
Our simulation results show that the proposed method brings a significant
reduction in the total power consumption compared to the previous works
where only SAN is used to ensure a certain outage probability at the Eve. We
also represent the effect of Eve’s location on the performance of the proposed
method. It is shown that in contrast to previous works, we are able to ensure
secrecy requirements even where Eve is very close to the Bob.
This paper is organized as follow. After presenting system model in Sec-
tion 2, the power allocation problem is proposed in Section 3. In Section 4,
simulation results are presented for both constrained and unconstrained power
scenarios at the destination. Finally in Section 5, the paper has been concluded.
Notation: Bold symbols in small and capital letter denote vectors and ma-
trices. In addition (.)H denotes the conjugate transpose and ‖.‖ is the norm
operator.
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2 SYSTEM MODEL
In this paper, we consider a network consisting of a data source (Alice), a
destination (Bob) and an eavesdropper (Eve). It is assumed that the source and
the destination are equipped with NA ≥ 2 and NB ≥ 2 antennas, respectively,
while Eve is equipped with NE ≥ 1 antenna. The channel gains between Alice
and Bob is represented by a matrix HAB of size NA ×NB and it is assumed
to be known to all nodes. In the other hand the channel gains between Alice
and Eve is represented by a matrix HAE of size NA × NE and the channel
gains between Bob and Eve by a matrix HBE of size NB × NE which are
unknown for the legal nodes (Alice and Bob). All channel gains are modelled
by independent zero-mean complex Gaussian random variables. The variances
of the above channels are σ2HAB , σ
2
HAE
and σ2HBE for the channel between Alice
and Bob, Alice and Eve and Bob and Eve, respectively. IfH be a channel gains
matrix (small scale fading effects), by considering the path loss effect, we can
define Hˆ as [5],[14]
Hˆ = (λ0r
−κ)1/2H (1)
where λ0 is a constant that is used for showing the power at a reference signal
and it determined by empirical measurements. In addition r is the distance
between two nodes and κ is the path loss exponent and depends on the prop-
agation environment. The values of this parameter is typically between 2 and
6.
We assume that the Eve’s location is unknown to the legal nodes and
has a uniform distribution in a circle with radius rab, where rab is the distance
between Alice and Bob. Also it is assumed that the legitimate users are located
at the center of the area (Fig. 1).
To enhance the security of the system, we assume that only one of the
destination antennas is employed for receiving the data signal and the other
antennas are assigned to the AN propagation (i.e. DAN). On the other hand, all
source antennas could be used to transmit both precoded data signal and AN
(i.e. SAN). To decrease the power consumption and enhance the performance
at the Bob, we select its best antenna (i.e. the j th antenna) for receiving data
from Alice. One approach for selecting this antenna is as follows:
j = arg max
i
{∥∥HiAB∥∥} (2)
where HiAB is the ith column of HAB which is related to the ith antenna
at the destination and i = 1, 2, ..., NB . Therefore the channel assigned to the
data transmission between Alice and Bob is denoted by a vector hAB of size
NA. In addition, the channel matrix between the remaining Bob’s antennas
and Eve is presented by a matrix H˜BE of size (NB − 1)×NE .
In addition assuming that Eve uses the selection combining method, the
channel vector between Eve’s kth antenna and Alice is denoted by hAE of size
NA, while hBE of size (NB − 1) denotes the channel between Bob’s remained
antennas and Eve’s kth antenna.
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Fig. 1 System model
Now let x, yB and yE be the precoded data signal transmitted by Alice, the
received signal at Bob and the received signal at Eve, respectively. Therefore
yB = hˆ
H
ABx+ nB (3)
yE = Hˆ
H
AEx+
ˆ˜
H
H
BEν + nE (4)
where ν is the DAN emitting by Bob and we assume that its self-interference
can be completely canceled at the destination. Assuming there is no knowl-
edge about the Eve’s Channel State Information (CSI), DAN power must be
equally distributed among (NB−1) Bob’s antennas that are assigned to DAN
propagation. Hence we can write
ν =
√
P
NB − 1
NB∑
i=1
i 6=j
ηψi (5)
where P ≥ 0 is the power allocated to DAN, η is a complex scalar with unit
magnitude and uniform random phase, ψi is a vector of size NB whose ith
element is equal to one and all other elements are equal to zero. nB and nE
of size NE are the Gaussian noise terms with zero mean and variances σ
2
B and
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σ2EI, respectively. x is the beamformed signal transmitted by Alice and could
be written as
x =
√
ϕP´dt+
√
(1− ϕ)P´η (6)
where 0 ≤ ϕ ≤ 1 is a parameter that determines the ratio of power assigned
to the information signal and SAN, P´ > 0 is Alice’s total power, d is the
information symbol with E
{
|d|2
}
= 1 and t of size (NA) is normalized (‖t‖ =
1) beamforming vector. η is SAN vector of size (NA) that is orthogonal to t
(i.e., tHη = 0) and its covariance matrix is denoted by Cη as
Cη = E
{
ηηH
}
(7)
Therefore we have Tr {Cη} = 1. For the beamforming at the source node, as
proposed in [3], if ti is the ith eigenvector of hABh
H
AB and t1 is assumed to be
the principal eigenvector, it is assumed that t = t1. Based on the orthogonality
of the eigenvectors of hABh
H
AB , η is a linear combination of NA − 1 eigenvec-
tors, and hence it lies in the nullspace of hAB . Since Eve’s CSI is not known
to the legal nodes, the noise power equally is distributed to these eigenvectors
as follows
η =
√
1
NA − 1
NA∑
i=2
ηti. (8)
According to the above beamforming model, the signal to noise ratios
(SNRs) at the Bob and Eve’s kth antenna can be derived as
SNRB =
ϕP´‖hˆAB‖2
σ2B
(9)
and
SNRkE =
ϕP´ hˆHAEt1t
H
1 hˆAE
(1− ϕ)P´ hˆHAECηhˆAE + PNB−1 hˆHBEhˆBE
. (10)
3 The Power Allocation Problem
In this section, we discuss about the problem of power allocation to SAN and
DAN. To ensure secrecy, γb and γe QoS constraints should be satisfied at Bob
and Eve and hence the power optimization problem can be written as:
min
P,P´ ,ϕ
P + P´ (11a)
s.t. SNRB ≥ γb (11b)
P[SNRE ≤ γe] ≥ β. (11c)
In above optimization problem, (11b) is for satisfying a certain level of
SNR at Bob and (11c) guarantees a minimum value of outage probability at
Eve.
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As it can be seen, our object is a joint power optimization for source and
destination. Considering that Eve uses the selection combining method and
the channel matrix coefficients are independent, we have
P[SNRE ≤ γe] =
NE∏
k=1
P[SNRkE ≤ γe] = P[SNRkE ≤ γe]NE (12)
By substituting (9), (10) and (12) into (11) and considering (1), we have:
min
P,P´ ,ϕ
P + P´ (13a)
s.t.
ϕP´ ≥ γbσ2B(λ0r−κAB)−1‖hAB‖−2 (13b)
P[
ϕP´ (λ0r
−κ
AE)h
H
AEt1t
H
1 hAE
(1− ϕ)P´ (λ0r−κAE)hHAECηhAE + PNB−1 (λ0r
−κ
BE)h
H
BEhBE
≤ γe] ≥ β
1
NE (13c)
We can rewrite (13c) as
P[hHAEahAE + bhHBEhBE ≤ σ2E ] ≥ β
1
NE (14)
where a and b are defined as below
a = P´ λ0r¯
−κ
ae (ϕγ
−1
e t1t
H
1 − (1− ϕ)Cη) (15a)
b = − P
NB − 1λ0r¯
−κ
be (15b)
where r¯ae = E[rae] and r¯be = E[rbe]. The left side in (14) can be interpreted
as a Cumulative Distribution Function (CDF). By defining
X = hHAEahAE (16)
Y = hHBEhBE (17)
and Z = X + bY , we have
FZ(z) = P[X + bY ≤ z]
= P[hHAEahAE + bhHBEhBE ≤ z]
=
∫ +∞
−∞
fY (y)dy
∫ z−by
−∞
fX(x)dx (18)
where
∫ z−by
−∞ fX(τ)dτ = FX(z − by) is the CDF of X. On the other hand X
is an indefinite Hermitian quadratic form for x ≥ 0 [1, 8], so FX(x) can be
derived as [1]:
FX(x) = u(x) +
α1
|λ1|e
(−xλ1 )u(
x
λ1
) (19)
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where
α1 = − λ1
(1− λ2λ1 )(NA−1)
(20)
and
λ1 = ϕP´λ0r¯
−κ
ae γ
−1
e σ
2
HAE ≥ 0 (21a)
λ2 = −(1− ϕ)P´ λ0r¯−κae σ2HAE (NA − 1)−1 ≤ 0. (21b)
In addition, Y is sum of the squares of 2(NB − 1) independent normal
random variables and has chi-squared (χ2) distribution as
fY (y; 2(NB − 1)) =
( y
σ2HBE
)(NB−2).e
( −y
2σ2
HBE
)
σ2HBE2
(NB−1)Γ (NB − 1)u(y). (22)
Therefore (18) can be rewritten as
FZ(z) =
∫ +∞
0
fY (y)dy
∫ z−by
−∞
fX(x)dx, (23)
Considering (z− by) ≥ 0, substituting (19) and (22) into (23) and considering
σ2HBE = 1, we have
FZ(z) =
∫ +∞
0
1
2(NB−1)(NB − 2)!y
(NB−2)e−0.5ydy
+
∫ +∞
0
α1e
(−zλ1 )
2(NB−1)(NB − 2)!|λ1|y
(NB−2)e(
b
λ1
−0.5)ydy (24)
After some manipulations, FZ(z) in (24) derived as
FZ(z) = (1 +
(−1)NBe(−zλ1 )
2(NB−1)(1− λ2λ1 )NA−1( bλ1 − 0.5)(NB−1)
). (25)
Substituting (21) and (25) into (13), the optimization problem in (13) is
simplified as
min
P,P´ ,ϕ
P + P´ (26a)
s.t. ϕP´ ≥ γbσ2B(λ0r−κAB)−1‖hAB‖−2 (26b)
(1− 2
(1−NB)e
(
−γeσ2E
ϕP´λ0r¯
−κ
ae σ
2
HAE
)
(1 + (1−ϕ)γeϕ(NA−1) )
(NA−1)( P r¯
−κ
be γe
(NB−1)ϕP´ r¯−κae σ2HAE
+ 0.5)(NB−1)
) ≥ β 1NE .
(26c)
According to (26c), it is obvious that the optimum value for (26b) is ϕP´ =
γbσ
2
B(λ0r
−κ
AB)
−1‖hAB‖−2, therefore the optimization method needs to only be
applied to (26c). We use standard numerical methods to solve the problem.
The final publication is available at Springer http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s11277-016-3865-9 (Read Online at http://rdcu.be/qmtg)
8 Ali Rahmanpour et al.
4 Simulation and Numerical Results
In this section, we evaluate the performance of our proposed method by com-
puter simulations. In our simulations, it is assumed that σ2HAB = σ
2
HAE
=
σ2HBE = 1, rAB = 2 Km, γE = 0.5 and σ
2
B = σ
2
N = 4 × 10−14. For the
path loss, it is assumed that λ0 = 10
−1 and κ = 3. Also the channel be-
tween Alice and Bob, HAB is generated randomly with a distribution of
HAB ∼ CN (0, σ2HABI).
To represent how changes in the main parameters of our problem influence
the security and power consumption, we first consider a scenario in which the
destination has no power constraint for DAN. Then we also investigate the
effect of a power constraint on DAN at the destination.
Case a) Destination has no power constraint for DAN
As mentioned before, we assume that the Eve’s location is distributed uni-
formly on the area and r¯ae = r¯be = 1000. In addition we first assume that
NE = NA = NB = 4. As it is seen in Fig. 2, in the case that both DAN and
SAN are used, the required power for AN to achieve a given outage probability
at the Eve is much less than the case that only SAN is used. In addition, in
both cases, with increasing γB , more power is needed to guarantee the given
outage probability at the Eve.
In Fig. 3, we investigate the effect of different number of antennas at the
Eve on the required power for the case NA = NB = 4. It could be seen
that when Eve has more capabilities, more power is needed to achieve a given
outage probability. In Fig. 4, the required power for AN is shown for different
values of NA and NB , when NE = 4.
In another scenario, we assume Alice and Bob are located at locations
(−1000, 0) and (1000, 0), NE = NA = NB = 4, γB = 0.5 and β = 0.6. The
total power should be allocated to AN to achieve a target outage probability
at Eve (β) while Eve moves from (−1500, 0) to (15000, 0) is shown in Fig. 5.
From this figure, it is seen that by using DAN we need less power to guarantee
a similar β. Especially in the case that Eve is close to Bob, it is still possible
to guarantee a given security.
Case b) Destination has a power constraint
Although Full Duplex technique is advancing so fast and today it is possible
to cancel even high levels of Self-Interference at the destination ([9] and [13]),
but it is still useful to investigate how power consumption will be changed
by limiting the maximum power allocated to the DAN. This is the case that
is considered in Fig. 6. As we see in this figure, at the outage probability
β = 0.9 and for NE = NA = NB = 4, when DAN power limitation decreases
from 2mW to 0.5mW , total required Power for AN increases from 15mW to
20mW .
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Fig. 2 The required power for AN (total SAN and DAN) versus the target outage proba-
bility (β) at the Eve, for NE = 4, for γE = 0.4 and 0.6.
5 Conclusion
In this paper, using destination artificial noise along with source artificial
noise is introduced to guarantee an intended outage probability at Eve, while
ensuring a certain SNR at Bob. For both constrained and unconstrained power
allocation scenarios it has been shown how using the DAN, decreases the
total power which is required to guarantee an intended outage probability at
Eve. Using outage probability approach instead of secrecy capacity, makes our
solution appropriate for the quasi-static channels.
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